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Accounting and the ethics challenge: 
Re-membering the professional body 
 
 
Abstract 
Based on the P.D. Leake Lecture given at Chartered Accountants’ Hall in May 2007, 
this paper looks beyond recent financial reporting ‘scandals’ to consider the ‘standing 
challenge’ that ethics represents for accountants and the professional bodies that 
represent them.  It examines the notion of a profession and argues for a position that 
recognizes both the potential benefits of professionalization and the self-serving 
tendencies to which professions can be prone.  Such a position entails a view that the 
outcome of professionalization for society is a contingent matter rather than an 
inevitability (whether positive or negative) and therefore something that is worth 
attempting to influence.  In developing the argument, two major areas from the 
business ethics/corporate social responsibility literature, oriented towards business 
enterprises but also of relevance to professional bodies, are reviewed: whether being 
ethical ‘pays’ in financial terms; and whether formal codes are useful in promoting 
ethical behaviour.  The paper concludes by positing three models of the professional 
body and contending for a renewed notion of membership if professional bodies are to 
function as effective ‘moral communities’. 
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Accounting and the ethics challenge: Re-membering the professional body 
 
Introduction 
The title of this paper and the lecture on which it is based refer to the ethics 
“challenge”.  Before I go on to explore what I mean by this, I would like to begin by 
noting one challenge that faces me: there tends to be an expectation that anyone who 
dares to speak or write on ethics should be ethical.  I don’t wish to make any special 
claims here, but perhaps those on the receiving end of expositions on ethics often 
have in mind the old adage “practise what you preach”.  I suppose that, to the degree 
that academics are more than mere observers or detached analysts, to the degree that 
we hold forth on what should be done, we lay themselves open to a special 
requirement to be ethical.  However, for very particular reasons that will become clear 
below,1 I will attempt to keep my “preaching” to a minimum. 
Another feature of what I am doing is that I will attempt to cover quite a lot of 
ground, more than might be the case in a conventional academic paper.  Part of the 
reason for that is that, when invited to give the P.D. Leake Lecture, I was encouraged 
not to focus on financial reporting and audit – which is where so much of the public 
debate about accounting ethics tends to concentrate – but to look at ethics in a way 
that might be relevant to all members of the profession.  After all, one of the notable 
features of the British accountancy profession is the variety of roles its members 
occupy, particularly as – for various reasons – accountancy has served as a general 
management qualification in the UK (Armstrong, 1987; Matthews et al., 1998).  One 
of my tasks, inter alia, will therefore be to review some aspects of the general 
business ethics literature in a way that might be of interest to accountants and relevant 
to their thinking about ethics. 
In roundtable discussions with Chartered Accountants2 during the preparation for the 
Lecture, two questions addressed in the business ethics literature seemed to stand out.  
First, does being ethical pay?  In other words, what are the financial consequences of 
taking an ethical stance?  Second, are codes of ethics an effective means of promoting 
                                                 
1
 See my later comments on “moral community”. 
2
 I.e. members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales.  The discussions used a 
focus group research method. 
ethical behaviour?  I shall address both these questions in due course, but I shall 
situate them in the context of an argument to be developed through the paper. 
Because of my brief to look beyond financial reporting and auditing, my starting point 
will not be the familiar “scandals” of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and the like – 
which, it might be contended, have little to do with the UK profession, even if it has 
felt the backwash from them – but rather the question of what it means to be a 
profession.  Not only is this relevant to all qualified accountants and those with an 
interest in their activities, but it also provides a good starting point for considering 
ethics, which for many people today seems a rather vague and slippery matter.3  I am 
therefore going to look at what I call “the professional challenge”, which will be the 
first of three challenges within the overall “ethics challenge”.4 
 
The professional challenge 
My starting assumption is that professional ethics matter.  How much and in what 
ways, I will consider below, but I take it as given that the claims of professions and 
their members to act ethically – or, rather, the degree to which they fulfil them – have 
an impact on society.  This is why, though scandals may come and go, ethics is a 
standing challenge to professions.  It is important for professions to think about ethics 
not only in times of turbulence, or moral panic indeed, but in times of relative calm 
too.  Ethics is, or should be, an everyday feature of professional life, and it is not just 
– or even – about preventing major misdemeanours.5 
Consider two classic professions – medicine and the law – with which accountants 
have traditionally compared themselves (Macdonald, 1984, 1995).  What if doctors 
were just in it for what they could get, taking advantage of sick and vulnerable 
patients in their hour of need?  Or what if lawyers cared only about money, not their 
clients?  Perhaps you think the second example a poor one;6 in which you are possibly 
in agreement with a widespread view that professions – to use George Bernard 
                                                 
3
 It is a more concrete, “grounded” starting point than, say, philosophical ethics – though I will say a 
little about ethical theory below when I sketch a position regarding professional ethics. 
4
 The others are “payoff challenge” and the “practical challenge”. 
5
 It might be contended that “major” misdemeanours (however defined) are, or should be, a matter for 
the law.  I do not want to consider that question here though. 
6
 There was considerable laughter among the audience at the Lecture at this point, providing the 
opportunity for further ‘lawyer jokes’, which I have, perhaps wisely, chosen to omit from this written 
version. 
Shaw’s memorable phrase – are “a conspiracy against the laity”.  If so, that at least 
supports my point that professions and professional ethics (or lack of them) matter.  
On the other hand, if you think that, even if (say) lawyers tend to exploit those who 
lack their expertise, accountants do not, or at least not always, then you are probably 
sympathetic to my overall stance on professions.  In order to explain that stance, I 
want to delve a little further into what it means to be a profession. 
The term ‘profession’ is generally employed quite loosely in everyday speech, often 
being used to refer to any, or almost any, occupational group.  However, it has a 
narrower, more technical sense when used by people like sociologists.  Much of the 
academic debate about professions has asked what it means to be a profession and 
hence what marks off professions from other occupational groups (e.g. see Johnson, 
1972; Taylor et al., 1995).  It is an interesting debate, but whatever definition is 
invoked and however vague its boundaries, it is clear that accountancy qualifies as a 
profession.  This can be appreciated by examining the characteristics that tend to be 
associated with professions or, rather, professional bodies.  I think the following list is 
a fair summary of the broad consensus, even if is not the final word on the subject.7 
• There is a widely agreed and extensive specialist skill and knowledge base, the 
latter often of a somewhat theoretical kind. 
• The deployment of the knowledge base involves the use of discretion and 
judgment, not just the application of rules to routine circumstances. 
• Acquisition of the requisite skill and knowledge base involves a long period of 
training, with formal certification of competence (usually involving written 
examinations) and, frequently, some form of licence to practise. 
• It enjoys independence and self-regulation, with control over the knowledge 
base, setting of entry standards and criteria for membership, and responsibility 
for the disciplining of members. 
                                                 
7
 It might be better to view this list as being indications of family resemblance (see Wittgenstein 1958) 
rather than providing the basis for an essentialist definition.  It, and the discussion in which it is 
located, draws on various sources, particularly Abbott (1988), Davis (1997), De George (2006), Jary 
and Jary (1991), Larson (1977), Parry and Parry (1976), Reed (1992) and Taylor et al. (1995).  See also 
Pierce (2006).  See also Lord Benson’s list of nine obligations to the public in a 1992 House of Lords 
Debate (‘Criteria for a group to be considered a profession’ as recorded in Hansard (Lords), 8 July 
1992, 1206-1207, quoted in BCS (2006)).  I am grateful to Michael Izza for pointing me to Lord 
Benson’s list. 
• In many cases, there are high levels of personal and financial reward. 
• There are ethical codes (often formal, but not exclusively so), independent of 
contract or state law, and these are self-enforced. These demand more than 
conventional morality and law. 
The final item contains a clear reference to ethics, but it is worth considering why it is 
there.  I think the reason can be discerned in two of the themes that appear in the list. 
The first theme is expertise.  It is not enough to stipulate and examine the expert skills 
of professionals, for there is the question of what they then do with those high-level 
skills, how they use them.  Technical expertise puts the professional in a position of 
power and provides opportunities for exploitation of the inexpert lay person, who is in 
a weak position to reach a judgement on the quality of service provided – and who 
may be vulnerable in other ways too.8  The controlling of opportunities to take 
advantage of lay persons would appear to make professional ethics publicly 
potentially beneficial.9 
The second theme is self-regulation.  Holding itself to a higher standard of ethics than 
ordinarily required by law and conventional morality (see Davis, 1997; De George, 
2006) can be viewed as a promise that a profession makes to society, and the reward 
for that promise is self-regulation.  Or, to put it the other way round, the promise of 
higher standards of ethics is the price that a profession pays for the privileges that it 
enjoys, which include a degree of self-regulation.  Self-regulation tends to be 
jealously guarded, which suggests that it is highly valued by professions.  
Accountants are no exception in this regard. 
These are two good reasons – among others – for hoping for a high standard of ethics 
from professionals.  However, the crucial question is: do professions live up to this 
vision of higher-than-average ethics?  According to many critics, at the heart of the 
professional “project” is the pursuit of economic –and to some extent social – 
advantage.  In this view, professions are not about ethics at all.  Such critics seem to 
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 This is not just a question of the asymmetry in expertise though; it is also because professionals tend 
to supply ‘credence goods’ (Darby and Karni, 1973), such as advice, the quality of which is never 
apparent, or is apparent only after much delay.   
9
 Of course, one might respond with ‘caveat emptor’, but in situations such as these the lay person 
would often have to rely on a further professional to vouch for the work of the first, which is both 
inefficient and, conceptually at least, subject to infinite regress.  It is probably sensible for the lay 
person to keep ‘caveat emptor’ in mind, but it is of limited value here when compared with many other, 
everyday transactions. 
have at least some circumstantial evidence on their side for, as noted earlier, one 
common feature of professions such as accountancy is the superior earning power of 
their members. 
The essence of the argument of the critics is that professional bodies seek to secure a 
privileged position in the market for their services.  They control entry into the 
profession itself, thus ensuring not so much quality – which might appear a reasonable 
justification – but restricted supply.  Given the demand for a profession’s services 
(which professional bodies also seek to stimulate), this tends to increase remuneration 
to levels above what it would otherwise be. 
Thus not all observers are convinced that professions really do serve the public 
interest; quite the contrary.  For example, there have been sustained Marxist and, 
more recently, consumerist critiques of professions’ use of their privileged position to 
their own advantage.10  The negative assessment of professions – whatever the 
particular intellectual form it might take – is that they are fundamentally self-
interested endeavours, and that claims to ethics and serving the public interest are 
either a ‘smokescreen’ (Taylor et al., 1995) or, at best, a misleading ‘sideshow’.  The 
criticism is that the rhetoric of ethics and public service is just that, and no more. 
How should we assess and respond to such criticisms?  The first step is to 
acknowledge what the critics have got right.  They point to a real risk that professions 
as we know them tend to run.  However, the problem with such “totalizing” or 
“blanket” views is that they leave no room for considering whether some professions, 
in some places or circumstances, at some times, are less prone to abusing their 
privileged position or, indeed, are of significant public benefit – even if members 
continue to reap considerable rewards.11  While a healthy scepticism might be called 
for, dismissing professions tout court amounts to little more than cynicism, which 
closes the door to productive possibilities.  My contention is that the actual 
contribution of a particular profession is a contingent matter, not an inevitability.  If I 
am right that there can indeed be variation in the social contribution that professions 
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 Perhaps there is also a wider challenge to “authority” and distrust of entities seeking to advance 
collective interests. 
11
 Luetge (2005) argues that critics of business have to move beyond pre-modern ethics to recognize 
that, at the heart of modern economic life, are non-zero sum games.  Thus it is insufficient and far from 
satisfactory, when launching an ethical critique, to focus on the fact that one party gains from the 
situation.  Mutual advantages should be recognized and assessed. 
make, to which “blanket views” are inevitably blind, then it is worth considering how 
that can occur, and how a positive contribution can be encouraged.   
In a business-related profession (broadly conceived), a positive impact can occur via 
two principal routes.  First, there is the external role as provider of advice and services 
to clients.  This is the classic professional form which 19th century Chartered 
Accountants saw in doctors and lawyers and sought to emulate as they pursued 
professional status (Macdonald, 1995).  It is the site for the provision of audit, which 
can make a positive contribution to the quality of financial reporting and hence to the 
operation of markets – but which, of course, faces its own ethical challenges, 
particularly (so some would argue) when the cross-selling of non-audit services is 
involved.  However, this is not an issue I want to deal with directly, not least because 
plenty has been said about it already (e.g. Coffee, 2006; see Cowton, forthcoming).  
The principal point is that accountants have the potential to make a positive 
contribution through working to high ethical standards within the setting of a 
professional firm. 
The second route for accountants to have a positive impact is through their status as 
employees of non-professional firms – ordinary businesses, in the main, but also other 
sorts of organisations.  If, as noted earlier, professional accountants are supposed to be 
following higher-than-average ethics, one of the ways in which they can have an 
impact is highlighted by the concept of organizational-professional conflict (OPC).  
OPC is present when there is a tension between what the employing organisation is 
demanding and what professional ethics would require (Sorensen, 1967; see Brierley 
and Cowton, 2000).  If professional ethics dominate, then they will have had a 
positive impact on the ethical quality of organisational functioning.  Perhaps just as 
significantly, though, the position of qualified accountants in many organisations also 
means that they have the opportunity to influence the ethical tone or climate of the 
organisation for the better, if they bring their professional ethics to bear.12 
Such moral leadership could have a positive impact.  However, it is not necessarily 
the case that the contribution of qualified accountants to the ethical climate of 
business, whether as an outsider or as an employee, is in opposition to what those in 
control would otherwise wish to do.  Perhaps being more than averagely ethical 
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 A further potential contribution, in relation to the “business case” for ethics, will be discussed below. 
actually pays off financially.  Certainly there are those who want to see business being 
more ethical and assert this opinion with great regularity and confidence.  I will 
briefly review the evidence regarding this “payoff challenge” and develop what I hope 
is a helpful perspective on it. 
 
The payoff challenge 
Many times when I talk to people about business ethics, one of the first questions they 
ask is: does it pay?  Is there money in being moral?  Can you do well by doing good?  
Is there a “business case” for ethics?  The question is posed in many forms, but the 
same basic question is nevertheless posed.   
At one level the speed and frequency with which this question arises is quite 
depressing, but in defence of some of the people who pose it, they are not 
(necessarily) asking what’s in it for them but are interested in promoting what they 
take to be higher standards of behaviour.  They think, quite reasonably, that it will be 
easier to persuade people to follow an ethically desirable course of action if it can be 
shown that it is in their own interests to do so.  At the back of their mind is probably 
the assumption that commercial life is tough – which it can be – and that actions 
assumed to entail a financial sacrifice would not be seriously considered.  Perhaps 
they have in mind, too, a view of business as purely profit-oriented, the implication of 
which is that £1 of extra profit is worth the sacrifice of any amount of ethics (cf. 
Hooker, 1998).  Many people take this to be well summed up in the words of the late 
Nobel Prize-winning economist, Milton Friedman (1970): 
There is one and only one social responsibility of business, ‘to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud’. 
It is perhaps ironic that Friedman has become one of the most frequently quoted 
authors in business ethics, where he is usually being presented as a stalking horse– 
though often a misrepresented stalking horse.  I will not pursue a detailed analysis of 
his position here.  Rather, based partly on my perception of “Friedman-abuse”, I will 
highlight a few points to indicate the inherent weaknesses in the view that Friedman 
rules out business ethics. 
• Friedman was not referring to owner-managed or closely-held businesses such 
as private companies or partnerships.  He explicitly states this, and yet some 
writing on the ethics of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) implies 
that he thought they have to be focused purely on profitability.  Friedman 
clearly said that if owner-managers wish to indulge their particular ethical 
interests or social agenda through their business, that is their choice.  What 
concerned Friedman was executives in publicly listed corporations not 
pursuing the interests of shareholders, which he took to be increasing profits 
and hence dividends and/or capital gains.  We might note that he was writing 
before the advent of a noticeable contingent of ethical investors, but I will 
leave this particular interest of mine on one side here.13  My point is that there 
is a large part of the business sector which is not, subject to the need to 
survive, caught on the horns of any ethics versus profits dilemma.  Many 
accountants advise, or work in, these businesses, and it would be wrong to 
presume that they are all focused exclusively on making money.  The weight 
accorded to profits in the objective function of such businesses is a contingent 
matter, not one determined by institutional form. 
• Many parts of our economy are not constituted as for-profit businesses.  Of 
course, Friedman never said otherwise – though he was not in favour of an 
extensive public sector.  My point here is that an ethical agenda fits very 
naturally with the operations of many organisations with or for which 
accountants work, and as public and voluntary organisations are encouraged to 
be more “business-like”, I think it would be wrong to suppose that this has to 
drive out ethics: far from it, if they are to be properly managed and to meet 
their legitimate objectives. 
When put this way, it is obvious that, in a large swathe of organisational activity, 
ethics simply does not have to give way to making money all the time.  However, this 
is often neglected in debates about the ethics of accounting and the ethics of 
organisations, where such realms tend to be forgotten.  It is important that we 
remember to think about ethical issues related to accounting and how they might play 
out in these contexts too. 
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 See, for example, Cowton (1994, 1997a, 1999). 
• Nevertheless, publicly listed companies, with a divorce of ownership and 
control, are very important.  Does a Friedmanite position require that such 
businesses are “red in tooth and claw”, seeking to subjugate or compromise on 
ethics all the time in the pursuit of profits, subject only to the constraints of 
law.14  The simple answer to this is that they do not; and the simple reason is 
that, if ethics pays, managers should choose the ethical option.  If it pays, a 
Friedmanite would have no objections. 
So does taking the ethical option pay?  There has been plenty of research over more 
than 30 years into this question (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitsky et al., 2003), but 
the results are not wholly conclusive – or so it might seem.  There are various reasons 
for this.  If I depict the question in the simple form: 
EP? 
which should be read as asking whether being ethical leads to superior financial 
performance, I can begin to indicate some of the reasons that make the question so 
difficult to answer empirically.  I will deal with the expression from right to left.15 
First, how should we conceptualise and measure P?  This might seem relatively 
straightforward, but anyone with a knowledge of accounting and finance will quickly 
realise that it poses certain challenges.  For example, if we focus on profits, we have 
the difficulty of deciding on the appropriate form of profitability16 and the relevant 
time span: too short, and we might miss some impact, too long and we might lose any 
statistically discernible effect in a lot of noise, in spite of our attempts to control for 
other variables.  For publicly listed companies, at least, we might look for an impact 
on share prices, but if the financial benefits of an ethical stance are recognised by the 
stock market, they will be impounded in share prices at the point of recognition, not 
over the years that the stance is actually implemented.  Yet many studies examine 
periods during which a particular company’s ‘superior’ ethical stance will have been 
constant. 
                                                 
14
 Note, though, that some businesses might choose to break the law in the interests of profitability, 
depending on the probability and consequences of being caught.  This point is covered by Wagner-
Tsukamoto (2008) in an exploration of different approaches to business ethics through his ‘rationality-
of-ends/market-structure grid’. 
15
 Much of the literature in this area uses the abbreviations CSP (corporate social performance and CFP 
(corporate financial performance).  Because of the focus of this paper on professional ethics, to which I 
will be explicitly returning below, I employ a more generalized form. 
16
 As well as the issue of the reliability of disclosed profit figures, of course. 
Second, what sort of link () should we look for?  Many studies (and, implicitly, 
anecdotal examples) have used correlation, but if we rely on correlation, how can we 
be sure that we have found a link in the direction indicated?  Correlation is not 
causation, and some studies find a positive link the other way; namely, increased 
financial performance tends to lead to more ethical behaviour.  Together with other 
findings, this suggests the possibility of a ‘virtuous circle’ (Orlitsky et al., 2003).17 
Third, and perhaps most challenging, how should we conceptualize and measure E 
(see Wood and Jones, 1995)?  Bear in mind that we are interested in some companies 
being more ethical than others and whether that confers any competitive advantage.  
The research question is therefore concerned with relative rather than absolute ‘ethical 
performance’.  More important, ‘ethics’ seems to encompass so many possible 
dimensions – voluntary pollution control expenditure, keeping delivery promises, 
paying suppliers on time, honest advertising, charitable donations, progressive 
employment policies, to name just a few –and its basis, as well as its content, seem to 
be subject to so many different opinions.  Not surprisingly, different researchers take 
different approaches.  Some focus on particular dimensions, which sacrifices 
generalizability of findings regarding the question of whether ethics pays in favour of 
tractability (as well as expressing an interest in particular issues).  Others attempt to 
capture a broader concept of ethics, perhaps even using a general reputational 
measure.  However, what should enter such a construct, and what weights should be 
attached to the various components, is a moot point; and the chances of finding 
something both significant and useful are thereby limited. 
The conceptual and methodological challenges in undertaking such research are 
formidable and its results therefore prone to contestation.  Many researchers think 
they have found a positive link from ethics to financial performance, but some do not 
find any such link.  Some even find a negative one.  The results are described as 
‘inconclusive’ by Jones and Wicks (1999: 112) and ‘very mixed’ by McWilliams and 
Segal (2001).  Yet from their review of 127 studies, Margolis and Walsh (2003) were 
able to conclude that the balance of evidence is in favour of a positive link.  
Moreover, from their meta-analysis18 of 52 previous studies, Orlitsky et al. (2003) 
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 Of 127 studies reviewed by Margolis and Walsh (2003), 109 examined EP and 22 PE (i.e. four 
examined both).  Support for a positive relationship was found by the majority of studies in both cases. 
18
 Meta-analysis is a quantitative review method used to re-evaluate the relationship between variables 
across existing studies (see, e.g. Brierley and Cowton, 2000).  A major advantage over narrative 
were able to suggest that corporate responsibility and, to a lesser extent, 
environmental responsibility, is likely to pay off. 
Nevertheless, even if it is not clear that ethics pays – and some claim it is – the 
findings certainly tend not to imply that it never pays.  To put it colloquially, 
sometimes the good guys finish first, or at least in the medal positions; sometimes the 
bad guys do. 
Perhaps the problem is that the question is actually not a particularly sensible one to 
tackle empirically, certainly not at the level of generality at which it is typically 
posed, and which I have gone along with for the purposes of this argument.  Asking 
whether ethics pays is a bit like asking whether marketing pays, or whether 
management accounting does.  The terms cover such a vast range of practices 
(‘ethics’ even more so), and the value of those practices is going to depend on the 
situation and how they are carried out.  Thus, I would contend, the question is really 
the starting point for a research agenda but not a serious research question in isolation. 
Much more could be said about that research agenda, but for present purposes I would 
prefer to draw what I think is a strong practical conclusion from this possibly 
inconclusive body of empirical research: namely, that ethical initiatives in business 
should not be rejected automatically, without thought, even if the business concerned 
happens to be focused exclusively on making money.  I think that this kind of “ruling 
out” by business people might actually be quite common, eliminating the 
consideration of certain actions rather than taking them seriously; a kind of 
prejudice,19 if you like.  Managers often tend to view themselves as more constrained 
than they really are, and the assumption that a more ethical stance would involve 
financial sacrifice is fairly widespread – hence the clear desire of some empirical 
researchers to prove otherwise.  Accountants in business have an important role to 
play here, because if they also make this kind of assumption, if they fail to look for 
and quantify, or at least mention, the financial benefits that an ethically desirable 
course of action might generate, then the win-win opportunity will be missed.  
                                                                                                                                            
reviews is its power to provide for more valid inferences when conflicting results observed between 
small sample studies arise from statistical artefacts such as sampling error and measurement error – two 
concerns expressed about this particular tradition of research (Ullman, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 
1997. 
19
 I.e. prejudging. 
Because there are many dimensions to what it might mean for a business to be ethical, 
there are many ways in which a positive link might occur between ethics and 
profitability.  Many writers focus on the top line effects on revenue that result from 
customers appreciating what the business is doing or how it does it, but there are also 
possible cost advantages.  One of the crucial aspects that many people have remarked 
upon is how an ethical approach leads to a good reputation, which in turn leads to 
trust on the part of various stakeholders, and this can bring about things like improved 
sales, lower employee turnover or better terms from suppliers. 
Furthermore, we should not forget that sound ethics which lead to trust have also been 
identified as of great benefit for the economy as a whole.  Money might make the 
world go round, but one of the things that has been learnt from watching emerging 
economies is that trust makes it go round far better.  We know ethics pays at the 
macro level, promoting healthy markets.  This is an area where the accountancy 
profession can make a significant contribution, in all sorts of economies; which brings 
me back to the question of the profession, rather than the individual business. 
Issues of trust and reputation are also important at the level of the profession, for it is 
reputation that is the key to the rewards it receives and trust that is critical to the self-
regulation it enjoys.  As many businesses have recognized, a good reputation can be 
thought of as an intangible asset, and like all assets it is at risk of impairment.  This 
impairment may not always be accidental.  It is not difficult to show that the self-
interested development of a good reputation on the part of an individual actor – such 
as a business – is potentially unstable and subject to the risk of being deliberately 
depleted in what I would term “marginal” situations, for example, where survival is at 
stake or a decision has already been taken to exit.  In other words, a choice might be 
taken to exploit the trust that has been built up, to liquidate or “cash in” the 
reputational capital when there is insufficient incentive to maintain it.  I think this is 
less of a risk with a professional body than with, say, a small business, but there is 
nevertheless a significant “cashing in” risk.  That comes about because of the way in 
which a professional body’s reputation works. 
Individual members gain from the professional body’s reputation, particularly if their 
own individual “brand” – if I might put it that way – is not well known.  They are a 
qualified accountant able to use particular designatory letters, and that provides 
valuable signals in the marketplace including, if the professional body has got things 
right, about the standard of behaviour that can be expected from the individual 
member.  There is a sense in which the professional body’s reputation is lent out or 
entrusted to members, to the individual member’s advantage.  When a member acts 
correctly, which will usually be the case, that reputation is maintained and perhaps 
even enhanced a little.  But when the member acts wrongly, the professional body’s 
reputation is damaged – usually in a small way, but sometimes in a big way.  A 
member might be happy to use the reputation of the professional body responsibly 
much of the time.  However, in certain situations they might put that reputation, 
which they have done little or nothing to create or develop, at significant risk, seeking 
to “cash in” some of it in their own interests.  That is one way in which you can read 
many of the disciplinary cases on professional bodies’ websites, where a member has 
exploited the trust which his or her qualification has engendered on the part of a client 
or employer.  The question is: how can such misbehaviour be discouraged, and how 
can ethical behaviour be encouraged?  This is the “practical challenge” to which I 
now turn. 
 
The practical challenge 
As I turn to the practical challenge (or part of it, at least) of influencing professions to 
be ethical, I want to look at codes of ethics for two principal reasons.  First, as 
mentioned earlier, they are an expected feature of professions, and professional 
accounting bodies have recently been re-visiting this topic, following the 
promulgation of the IFAC code.20  A code is a key aspect of professional accountancy 
bodies’ ethics offering.  Second, codes have also become one of the most visible 
features of ethics in business21 and have accordingly attracted the interest of business 
ethics researchers.  Therefore, rather than provide a critique of a particular accounting 
code I will, in keeping with the level of argument of this paper and in order to make 
my comments relevant to the organizations in which accountants work as well as the 
body to which they belong, instead look at what we can learn from the research on 
codes in general. 
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 International Federation of Accountants – see http://www.ifac.org/Members/Pubs-
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 Some companies, though, prefer not to use the term “code of ethics”.  They might, for example, refer 
to their “code of conduct” or use some other such term. 
Given what I said earlier about whether ethics leads to improved financial 
performance, it is not surprising that it is difficult to draw firm, detailed conclusions 
about the positive impact of codes of ethics from the empirical research literature.  
This might seem to accord with the views of sceptics like Warren (1993), who 
condemns codes as ‘superficial and distracting answers to the question of how to 
promote ethical behaviour in corporate life’ (p.186). On a little reflection, mixed 
results might indeed be expected.  Codes vary from company to company in their 
intentions and content.  It is one thing to identify that a company has a code; it is a 
rather different matter to judge that the code a good one.  Furthermore, beyond what it 
says, there is the vital question of how (or even whether) the code is implemented.  To 
research the impact of codes therefore requires considerable sophistication and a large 
volume of research to cope with all the complexity.  We do not yet have sufficient, 
high-quality empirical studies to provide a comprehensive evidence base, and 
possibly never will. 
Nevertheless, there are some useful insights and some sensible advice available (e.g. 
Webley and Werner, forthcoming).  For example, some writers have drawn attention 
to the importance of the “tone from the top”.  This isn’t just leaders of the business (or 
profession) occasionally remembering to mention the ethics code, though that helps.  
Rather, it is that everything that is said is consistent with what the code of ethics 
states. 
One of the crucial things when drawing up a code is to get the balance of rules and 
principles right.  Principles alone too easily look like vague moral exhortation.  They 
will be viewed sceptically by outsiders and will be of limited  practical help to those 
to whom the code is intended to apply.  Detailed rules are needed, therefore, to put 
some flesh on the bones of the principles, providing practical guidance for the most 
common issues and situations that are likely to be met.  However, it should be 
recognized that the rules cannot cover all eventualities, and ambiguities will remain 
(Page and Spira, 2005).  That is clearly the case for a professional code intended to 
apply to members in a wide variety of settings, even if some attempt is made to 
explore various possible contexts.  There will always be gaps, which is why the 
principles have to be emphasized, in the hope of preventing the unscrupulous from 
treating those gaps as loopholes.  The rules are then expressions of the expected 
outworkings of the principles in some anticipated situations, but the responsibility of 
the person to whom the code applies is to give effect to the principles.  The focus on 
principles-based integrity, as discussed in Reporting with Integrity (2007), not just 
rules-based compliance, is therefore quite right.22 
That’s the theory, or good advice at least.  It is important to attempt to avoid legalism 
or moral ‘dumbing down’, a defensive or unthinking adherence to the rules, which – 
amongst other things – would amount to de-professionalization, if you recall the 
earlier point about professionals not simply applying formulae.  In this regard, one of 
the encouraging things that emerged from my discussions with qualified accountants 
was that they easily recognized, indeed tended to bring up, the distinction between 
principles and rules.  I think it fair to say that they supported the idea of putting 
principles first.  However, they also thought that, whatever a code or those promoting 
it might say, they were under great pressure to pay attention to the letter of the rules 
and found it difficult to gain much leverage from the principles, although there was a 
suggestion that this might apply less to members in business, who are under less 
threat of litigation. 
Another relevant factor regarding the rules versus principles issue is that there is some 
research evidence to suggest that accountants have a relatively strong preference for 
rules, which – if true – would tend to put them at one of the lower stages of moral 
development.23  Not all accountants are like this, of course, but it might be a tendency, 
which would tend to increase the risk of failing to follow the spirit of the code.   
Another interesting perspective, voiced by some of the accountants that I talked to 
during the preparation of this Lecture, was that the growth of other regulations and 
codes was diminishing the significance of any accounting ethics code for their day-to-
day professional experience.  The extent to which this is the case will vary from 
industry to industry – financial services are relatively heavily regulated, for example – 
but you can see the potential impact of what some business commentators have 
referred to as “code overload”. 
Some people – correctly – point out that a code does not stop bad things happening.  
For such people, the presence of an apparently excellent code at Enron is some sort of 
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 A clear outline of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development can be found in the Reporting with 
Integrity paper.  For relevant research results, see Lampe and Finn (1992), Ponemon (1990) and Shaub 
(1994); though cf. Fulmer & Cargile (1987), Green and Weber (1997) and Jeffrey (1993). 
proof that codes are a waste of time.  But a code itself cannot stop someone breaking 
it, no more than a law ensures that the behaviour legislated against never happens 
again.  This comparison with the law makes it unsurprising that one thing research has 
suggested is that there should be enforcement mechanisms to discourage the code’s 
being broken and to reassure others to whom it applies and outsiders that it is taken 
seriously by the body to which it belongs (Molander, 1987).  But in the final analysis, 
the only way to ensure that codes – or indeed laws – are not broken, is not to have 
them in the first place! 
Of course, codes of ethics are not the same as law.  Some of the reasons for this are 
obvious, but there is one important respect in which they differ that is easily missed in 
discussions of professional ethics.  It was argued earlier that professional ethics 
should be above and beyond what law and ordinary morality demand; this is certainly 
the claim of professional accounting bodies.  However, this sets up a tension 
regarding enforcement, in relation to the disciplining of members.  First, in practice, 
many disciplinary cases seem to involve the sanctioning of members who have 
already been found guilty of a criminal offence; this is a necessary “tidying up” 
operation for a professional body to engage in, but it is of limited significance for the 
maintenance of professional ethics.  Second, of the remaining cases, how many are 
about an alleged failure to observe high standards of professional ethics?  I would 
suggest that very few, if any, are.  Instead, they are focused on lower level breaches.  
Of course, this is only to be expected, for all sorts of practical reasons.  My point is 
not that a large proportion of the profession should be subject to formal disciplinary 
procedures, but rather that – given the importance of enforcement mechanisms – there 
is a natural limit on the degree to which codes of ethics can drive high standards of 
behaviour.  They are better suited to dealing with ethical shortcomings than to raising 
aspirations – though that does not mean that they should not have aspirational content. 
Perhaps this seems a little negative, but I would not agree with those critics who say 
that codes are always a complete waste of time – or worse.  Perhaps some company 
ethics codes are little more than PR, published as a knee-jerk reaction to some bad 
publicity or a pressing issue and then forgotten about.  But sometimes they are rather 
more useful.  In this I am echoing my earlier comments about the nature of 
professions; I am seeking to avoid a negative generalization that then neglects and 
indeed suppresses any potential a code might have.  And in the final analysis, I think 
it difficult to argue that a profession should not have a code at all. 
Some people might point out that, traditionally, no attempt was made to codify ethics 
in written form at all, yet ethics was not absent.  It was purely an oral tradition, built 
into the culture.  In the research I conducted prior to this Lecture, some of the 
accountants talked about how they “just know” what they are supposed to do.  But 
they were highly experienced members and, as they acknowledged, entered the 
profession in different circumstances from those that obtain today.  In any case, if 
properly used, a code does not necessarily undermine a culture.24  In fact, it can be 
used to express it, or at least something about it, both to outsiders so that they have 
some sense of what to expect, and to insiders – especially new recruits.  This is 
particularly important now that business is so international and entrants to the 
profession come from increasingly diverse backgrounds.  What some recruits “just 
know” might be very different from what established member of the profession hope 
they will think, and a code can provide useful explicit guidance, even if it is only a 
start.  In this day and age, a code might be necessary – but, of course, it could hardly 
be sufficient (Webley and Werner, forthcoming), and not too much should be 
expected of it, even while it is being treated with appropriate seriousness.  It’s the 
same with any tool used in isolation when seeking to influence something as complex 
as human behaviour in the large.  If we are to be practical about ethics, if we are to 
take it seriously, we have to do many different things.  Ethics – good or bad – is at its 
most powerful when it is just part of the way you do things, part of the culture, part of 
the way qualified accountants think.  Tools can help support this, but they cannot 
really replace it. 
However, what should be the content of ethics?  If we are to be practical, should we 
not specify what we mean by being ethical?  Earlier, I stated that I wanted to keep my 
“preaching” to a minimum, and I do not wish to launch into an attempt to lay out a 
scheme of ethics for accounting.  I will do so by outlining a way of thinking about 
ethics. 
Let me change the subject (apparently) to territory in which accountants will find 
themselves more at ease.  What is 2+2?  I hope you will immediately think “4”.  How 
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or why do we know that 2+2=4, though?  I would suggest it is because we have joined 
a community of practice, the community of practitioners of arithmetic.  We have 
learnt the rules, become competent practitioners of them, been imbued with them to 
such an extent that the answer is obvious and in need of no justification.  Some 
philosophers who have wrestled with the nature of ethics have suggested ethical 
knowledge is rather like this, and I think it has a lot to be said for it.  We join a moral 
community, albeit one that through engagement within itself and with those around 
might come to evolve its rules over time.  If one metaphor for ethics is taking 
fundamental truths as a foundation and building a sturdy structure on top of that 
foundation (but these days worrying that we don’t know what the foundations should 
be or won’t agree on them), the metaphor here might be the idea of joining a boat 
afloat on the seas, which undergoes a continual process of maintenance and, 
sometimes, change: a boat that is made both for us and by us.  I hope you don’t get 
the wrong impression here though: a moral community is not a club for talking ethics.  
Moral communities do things, real things, but they share ethical “software”.25 
This notion of a moral community, and the idea of a profession as a moral 
community, fits well with the idea of becoming competent practitioners of what a 
code of ethics stands for, of “just knowing” what the principles mean in the situation 
in which you find yourself – even if in the early days you had to follow the rules in a 
more mechanical fashion.  As I said earlier, though, professions vary in the extent to 
which they seek to meet seriously the standing ethics challenge that they face.  And so 
it follows that the degree to which they are an effective moral community will vary.  
It is particularly challenging for large, diverse associations such as many of the 
professional accounting bodies; members come from, or work in, different cultures, 
and they undertake a large variety of roles, with the “practice/industry” split being a 
very significant one.26  One way of thinking about this is to look at the various tools 
available, but I have already looked at one principal tool, a code of ethics, and made 
some comments on that.   
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 This came up quickly and frequently in the roundtable discussions I held while preparing the 
Lecture. 
Instead, in the time remaining I want to take a slightly different tack.  I will identify 
three versions of a professional body (there may be more) which can be seen to reflect 
various strands of the preceding discussion.  These are general models.27  I am not 
saying that any particular professional body is exactly like this; I am referring to 
possibilities and tendencies. 
Version 1: the qualification professional body 
This professional body does little more than act as an examining institution.  It is 
responsible for testing students and certifying their knowledge.  It might have ethics 
in the exam syllabus – indeed it should – but on its own this will have limited impact 
and will do little or nothing to build a moral community, though there may be other 
helpful processes going on during training, depending on how it is organized.  To be a 
member is to be little more than just someone who holds a qualification.   
Version 2: the customer-focused professional body 
This professional body has a more sustained relationship with those who have 
qualified with it.  It continues to provide them with benefits, for which they pay their 
annual subscription.  These benefits might include the borrowing of the professional 
body’s reputation through the use of designatory letters and other signs of 
professional competence and trustworthiness, as discussed earlier, but it will also 
include services.  In this case the members are seen as customers.  Several of the 
professional accounting bodies based in the UK are large organizations, which 
enables them to exploit economies of scale, but with that size based on the 
professional success of accountants in the UK (Armstrong, 1987; Matthews et al., 
1998) comes a varied membership, with many different roles performed and hence the 
challenge of providing a sufficient range of services to meet members’ needs and 
expectations. 
Viewing our relationship with an organization to which we pay money as a 
transactional one is a familiar one.  Many members no doubt wonder about whether 
the annual subscription is worth it, and professional body staff worry about whether 
enough is provided to such members to coax them to continue to part with their 
money.  If such members think of themselves as customers, then it is not a bad idea 
for professional body staff to think of them that way too.  “What do we provide to 
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members in public practice?  What do we provide to members in business?  What do 
we provide to members who never come to HQ?”  There, and others, are sensible 
questions to ask.  
However, I think this “member as customer” notion has corrosive effects if it becomes 
too dominant.  Some people even suggest it is not the best way of running a 
conventional business; your customers have to be more than customers, they say.  The 
problem is that the notion of customer is apt to reduce everything to a question of 
transactions, and this tends to drive out any notion of relationship.28  What scope for 
moral community then?  This brings me to my third version. 
Version 3: the “membered” professional body 
The third version goes beyond the idea of the member as customer and finds its way 
back to the roots of the word “member” and, indeed, “body”, as in “professional 
body”.  We often forget about this in everyday usage, but just think what a member is: 
it is a limb or, by extension, part of a body.  We still use it in that sense when we talk 
about “dismembering”.  A member is joined in, indeed jointed in.  A professional 
body, like any body, is made up of its members.  This version of a professional body 
is the one that can best carry the idea of a profession being a moral community.  At 
one level then, my principal proposal for meeting the ethics challenge face by 
professional bodies is simply: 
 Re-member the professional body 
It’s certainly an easy slogan to recall.  What it points towards is the need to keep in 
view what it means to be a member of a professional body as a moral community – 
hopefully a well-functioning one.   
So to recap.  What does it mean to be a qualified accountant, to be a member of a 
professional body?  Is it someone who has passed the exams and can use the 
designatory letters as a passport to a well paid and rewarding career (see Version 1)?  
Yes, but it is more than that.  Is it someone who continues to pay the annual 
subscription because they value what they get out of their professional body (see 
Version 2)?  Yes, but it is more than that I hope, and it needs to be more than that if 
members are to develop some form of shared culture.  Members should have their 
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own fleshed-out view of what it means for them to be a qualified accountant.  That 
will include in their natural place, not as an add-on, a whole lot of things that the 
member “just knows” when it comes to matters related to professional ethics, and 
hopefully those things will bear a strong resemblance to what other members “just 
know”. 
So my position is that, while we don’t forget ethics as something to focus on for 
special attention, we make sure that it is one part of a well-rounded notion of what it 
means to be a member of a professional body.  Although I am not attempting to spell 
out a practical programme of action to accomplish this, one way of taking this agenda 
forward a little is to think about how people join, participate in and perhaps fail – and 
therefore need to be disciplined by or even expelled from – that community.   
So, for example, what are the messages given to potential students – or “junior 
members”, as we might think of them – in the recruitment material that is provided to 
them?  They know that many qualified accountants make lots of money.  Perhaps they 
think the work, especially in the early days, will be dull and involve lots of hard 
study; but they are willing to put up with that for the prospect of the money –  and we 
can try to tell them that it really can be fun.  But what else do we tell them?  What 
other messages do we give them about what it means to be a qualified accountant, a 
member of a particular professional body?29 
And once they have qualified – having studied some ethics, of course – what do we 
expect of them?  To keep up to date, technically, in their area of specialism and to pay 
their annual subscription?  Of course.  But what about their participation in the body, 
in the moral community, which entails both their further integration into it and their 
contribution to it?  Of course, it is difficult to get busy members to participate in 
activities and local societies do not appeal to all, as many professional bodies know.  
What we need is plenty of different ways for members to participate and interact, and 
no doubt professional bodies’ staff give lots of thought to this.30 
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responsibilities of qualified accountants.  I am merely raising the issue for attention and reflection. 
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 The Lecture and subsequent reception was, in its way, an example of such interaction.  Every 
ICAEW member who attended therefore deserves some credit, not just for listening to my ponderings 
but for being there in the first place, for doing more than simply paying the annual subscription and – 
hopefully – staying out of trouble. 
As something of an outsider, I would not wish to claim any special insights and come 
up with a list of naïve proposals about professional participation, but I would like to 
mention one possibility for consideration.  Many professional bodies distinguish 
between different levels of membership, with UK accountancy bodies offering both 
“associate” and “fellow” status, with appropriate designatory letters available.  What 
should you have to do to be up-graded to “fellow”.  Different models are possible: 
serving so much time, without getting into trouble, and then paying a higher fee; 
proving that you have been operating at a certain level of responsibility; or perhaps 
even writing some sort of thesis.  But note the difference between the words 
“associate” and “fellow”.  The latter sounds much more joined in, part of things, a 
“real member”.  Perhaps before an associate becomes a fellow, the question ought to 
be asked: how does this person engage with the professional body beyond paying 
their subscription?  Are they more than merely “associated” with it?  I raise the issue 
both because of the difference in what the words “associate” and “ fellow” connote in 
everyday usage and because it seems to be one of the few opportunities or levers 
available for addressing the part that individual members play in the professional 
(moral) community. 
Finally, talking of levers, there is the question of the disciplining of those who fail the 
community – possibly even to the point of expulsion from it, thus severing the 
offending member from the body.  Again, space precludes me from attempting a 
detailed critique of what professional accounting bodies do on this front, though I 
would note two things.  First, as mentioned earlier, research on codes of ethics 
suggests enforcement mechanisms are important.  Second, and again as mentioned 
earlier, it is worth reviewing disciplinary cases to see where professional bodies are 
exerting some pressure and where they might be failing to do so.  I think we can, from 
the “higher-than-average” professional ethics point of view, treat those cases which 
concern the disciplining of members who have been found guilty of breaking the law 
as of marginal interest.  The question is: what are the other cases about, and what is 
missing?  For example, if there is an apparently disproportionate number of cases 
dealing with members from public practice rather than business, what is the 
significance of this?  Ending my exposition on disciplinary issues might appear to 
strike a negative note, but if the ethical pronouncements of professional bodies do not 
come to be reflected in their disciplinary activities, how seriously are external 
observers likely to take those pronouncements? 
 
Conclusion 
In seeking to explore the nature of the “ethics challenge” facing accountants, I have 
broken it down into three subsidiary challenges; the professional challenge, the payoff 
challenge, and the practical challenge.  Two issues addressed under the second and 
third challenges – whether being ethical pays and how useful codes of ethics are – 
played a dual role in the exposition of the paper: they are relevant to the 
organizations, especially businesses, in or for which many accountants work; and they 
are also relevant, to a greater or lesser extent, to professional bodies themselves. 
I began the main part of my analysis by looking at the notion of a profession.  I 
suggested that professions can vary in the degree to which they serve the public 
interest by being ethical.  Implicit in what I have been saying are two very simple 
models linking those three elements of profession, ethics and rewards (especially 
financial). 
1. A profession is a valuable technical and ethical endeavour and therefore 
deserves its considerable rewards. 
2. A profession is a successful conspiracy against society and seeks to justify its 
considerable rewards through a smokescreen of ethics. 
The challenge for professional accountancy bodies, or at least those persons who 
would seek to influence them, from within or without, is to ensure that they fall 
squarely within the former and do not drift into the latter.   
So what are the prospects for successfully following model 1 on a consistent basis?  It 
is easy to be cynical.  Certainly the challenges are always there and human behaviour 
and motivations are, as ever, somewhat mixed.  My overall view is that the prospects 
are mixed too.  There will always be members who fail to live up to professional 
standards.  But it is the fact that they are seen to have fallen short that shows that there 
is an understanding that standards exist and should obtain.  Moreover, there will from 
time to time be failures that, for one reason or another, take on the status of 
“scandals”, and the profession will have to deal with their consequences.  Professional 
ethics in general and accounting ethics in particular will never be perfect.  However, if 
failures are no longer seen as failures but as “par for the course”, if you think that talk 
of professional ethics is a nonsense– as the “blanket” condemnations referred to 
earlier would tend to encourage – then you end up in a worse position than if you try 
and only partially succeed.  As long as professions and professional bodies exist there 
should be a creative tension between what they are and what they should be; the real 
problem is when there is no tension but just a gap that no-one wants, or feels able, to 
do anything about. 
Many of the things that the accountancy profession is doing now – such as codes of 
ethics, the ICAEW’s Reporting with Integrity paper, the coverage of ethical matters in 
examinations – are to be applauded.  On their own, they can perhaps achieve 
relatively little – certainly it would be wrong to expect too much of them in isolation.  
However, taken together and in the context of “re-membering the professional body” 
they have the potential to help build a decent moral community.  The real ethical 
failure would be not to try to do anything, or to pretend to try and not take it seriously.  
Ethics is a serious business,31 and so are professions. 
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